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The Resource Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 : Winning Without Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises

Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 : Winning Without Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises

Label
Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 : Winning Without Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises
Title
Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017
Title remainder
Winning Without Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises
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Subject
Language
eng
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Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
NL ARMS
Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 : Winning Without Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises
Label
Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 : Winning Without Killing:The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises
Link
http://libproxy.rpi.edu/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rpi/detail.action?docID=4915496
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Copyright
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Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Foreword -- Contents -- About the Contributors -- 1 The Promise, Practice and Challenges of Non-Kinetic Instruments of Power -- 1.1 Rediscovering a Neglected Instrument -- 1.2 When the Weak Become the Strong -- 1.3 Flaws in the Strategic Logic -- 1.4 Organizational, Bureaucratic and Political Obstacles -- 1.5 Limited Understanding of Engineering Behavioural Change -- 1.5.1 The Limits of Economic Rationality -- 1.5.2 Emotion: Fear, Uncertainty, Honour, Habits, Values -- 1.5.3 Risk Propensity -- 1.5.4 Short Cuts, Biases and Heuristics -- 1.6 Progress, Caution, and Necessity -- References -- 2 The Resilient Mind-Set and Deterrence -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Home Front Under Threat -- 2.3 Vulnerability of the West -- 2.4 The Emergence of Resilience -- 2.5 Resilience Theory and Security -- 2.6 Resilience Theory and Deterrence -- 2.7 Conclusions -- References -- 3 On the Instrumentality of Soft Power -- or Putin Against Democracy Promotion -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Democratization and the Balance of Power -- 3.3 A New Cold War? -- 3.4 Realist Framing -- 3.5 Democratization as Soft Power -- 3.6 How Democracy Spreads -- 3.7 Conclusion -- References -- 4 'NATO Needs More Than Planes and Tanks and Guns'-Western Strategic Communication in the 1970s and 1980s and Its Implications for Today -- Abstract -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Origins -- 4.3 Setting the Stage -- 4.3.1 Contradictions -- 4.4 Epilogue -- References -- 5 The Snake Oil of Stabilisation? Explaining the Rise and Demise of the Comprehensive Approach -- Abstract -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Roots of the Comprehensive Approach -- 5.3 The Rise of a Concept -- 5.4 Early Signs and Causes of Demise -- 5.5 Anything but Comprehensive: The Afghan Legacy -- 5.6 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Winning Without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions -- Abstract -- 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 The Evolution of Sanctions: From Comprehensive to Targeted -- 6.3 The Purpose of Sanctions: Coercing, Constraining and Signalling -- 6.4 Opportunities and Challenges -- 6.5 Improving Targeting Strategies -- 6.6 Conclusions -- References -- 7 International Mediation in Syria's Complex War: Strategic Implications -- Abstract -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Strategy and Proxy War in the Syrian Context -- 7.3 Joint UN-Arab League Mediation Process: Limitations and Failure -- 7.4 Key Issues and Challenges: Multilateral Mediation in Syria's War -- 7.4.1 Uncertainty and Unpredictability -- 7.4.2 Limitations of Ripeness and Hurting Stalemate -- 7.4.3 Coercion and Mediation: Military Intervention and the Use of Force -- 7.5 Conclusions and Implications for Non-Kinetic Strategy -- References -- 8 Lo and Behold: Let the Truth Be Told-Russian Deception Warfare in Crimea and Ukraine and the Return of 'Maskirovka' and 'Reflexive Control Theory' -- Abstract -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Neglecting and Rediscovering the Information Domain -- 8.3 Deception Warfare -- 8.4 Structure of Deception Warfare -- 8.5 How Deception Works -- 8.6 Russian Deception Warfare -- 8.7 'Maskirovka' -- 8.8 Reflexive Control -- 8.9 'Dezinformatsiya' -- 8.10 Findings in Ukraine and Russia -- 8.11 Closing Remarks -- References -- 9 Manoeuvring and Generating Effects in the Information Environment -- Abstract -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Where? Manoeuvring in the Information Environment -- 9.2.1 Doctrinal History of the Information Environment -- 9.2.2 A Model of the Informational Environment -- 9.3 Why? Pursuing, Promoting and Securing National Interests -- 9.4 Doing What in the Information Environment -- 9.5 Requirements for Manoeuvring in the Information Environment -- 9.5.1 Conceptual Component -- 9.5.2 Physical Component -- 9.5.3 Moral Component -- 9.6 Examples
  • 9.6.1 Information Campaign 'U.S. Election Hacks' (2016) -- 9.6.2 'BlackEnergy' Operation (2015) -- 9.7 Conclusion -- References -- 10 Strategic Counter-Marketing to Fight ISIL -- Abstract -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 P for Product -- 10.3 P for Price -- 10.4 P for Place -- 10.5 P for Promotion -- 10.6 Towards Strategic Counter-Marketing -- 10.7 Conclusion -- References -- 11 Delegitimising the Adversary: Understanding Actor and Audience Analysis as a Tool to Influence and Persuade -- Abstract -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Delegitimisation -- 11.3 Defining the Objective: Deterrence or Compellence? -- 11.4 Understanding the Frame of Reference -- 11.4.1 Actor and Audience Analysis -- 11.4.2 Deterring Potential Supporters: Learning from (Counter-)Radicalisation -- 11.4.3 Compelling Active Members: Learning from de-Radicalisation -- 11.5 Principles of Social Influence and Persuasion -- 11.5.1 The Role of the Communicator -- 11.5.2 The Message: Techniques of Persuasion -- 11.6 Conclusion -- References -- 12 Profiling Terrorists-Using Statistics to Fight Terrorism -- Abstract -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Terrorism -- 12.3 Profiling Terrorists -- 12.4 Identifying Terrorists by Means of Retail Banking Data -- 12.5 Conclusion -- References -- 13 Reframing Lawfare -- Abstract -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Rule of Law and Military Operations -- 13.3 A Primer on Lawfare from an Oplaw Perspective -- 13.3.1 Definition -- 13.3.2 Use of Law -- 13.3.3 Misuse of Law -- 13.3.4 Counter Lawfare -- 13.4 Refining the Lawfare Definition -- 13.4.1 Operational Goal -- 13.4.2 Object -- 13.4.3 Actor -- 13.5 Synthesis and Conclusion -- References -- 14 Non-Kinetic Capabilities and the Threshold of Attack in the Law of Armed Conflict -- Abstract -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 What Constitutes Attack? -- 14.3 New Non-Kinetic Capabilities -- 14.4 What Constitutes Attack in Cyberspace?
  • 14.4.1 Cyber Operation in Relation to Persons -- 14.4.2 Cyber Operation in Relation to Objects in Cyberspace -- 14.5 What Constitutes Damage in Cyberspace? -- 14.6 The Status of Data -- 14.7 Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- 15 Jamming and Spoofing: Effective Cyber Weapons Looking for a Defence -- Abstract -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Jamming and Spoofing -- 15.2.1 State-Based Jamming and Spoofing -- 15.2.2 Spoofing Going Mainstream -- 15.3 NLDA Research into Resilient Position, Navigation and Timing -- 15.3.1 GPS Augmentation for Artillery Operations, a Case Study -- 15.3.2 Spoofing Design and Testing -- 15.4 Conclusion -- References -- 16 Winning Without Killing in the South China Sea -- Abstract -- 16.1 Ba and Wang -- 16.2 Sun Tzu -- 16.3 Unrestricted Warfare -- 16.4 Chinese Grand Strategy -- 16.5 What Is at Stake in the South China Sea? -- 16.6 Maritime Strategy in the South China Sea -- 16.7 Unrestricted Warfare in the South China Sea -- 16.8 All Warfare Is Based on Deception -- 16.9 Conclusion -- References -- 17 Maritime Economic Enforcement Measures: 'Winning Without Killing' in Modern Conflicts at Sea -- Abstract -- 17.1 Introduction -- 17.2 Naval Forces and the Economy -- 17.3 Three Models of Economic Enforcement Measures at Sea -- 17.3.1 Economic Warfare Measures During International Armed Conflict -- 17.3.2 Maritime Embargo Operations in Support of the UN-Security Council -- 17.3.3 Maritime Security Operations (MSO): Policing the Seas in Peacetime Circumstances -- 17.4 The 'Non-Kinetic-ness' of Maritime Economic Enforcement Measures -- 17.5 The Legal Complexity of Maritime Enforcement Measures -- 17.6 Conclusion -- References -- 18 Employing Comprehensive Intelligence: The UN Experience in Mali -- Abstract -- 18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 Situational Awareness -- 18.3 Context and the Design of MINUSMA -- 18.4 Results
  • 18.4.1 Goal-Setting and Situational Awareness -- 18.4.2 System Complexity and Situational Awareness -- 18.4.3 Levels of Situational Awareness -- 18.4.4 Situational Awareness Is (Not) Action -- 18.4.5 Situational Awareness, Decision-Making and Execution -- 18.5 Generalizing Insights and Conclusion -- References
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1 online resource (337 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9789462651890
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
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remote

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