Coverart for item
The Resource Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures, Steven J. Brams

Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures, Steven J. Brams

Label
Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures
Title
Mathematics and democracy
Title remainder
designing better voting and fair-division procedures
Statement of responsibility
Steven J. Brams
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods
Cataloging source
N$T
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures, Steven J. Brams
Label
Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures, Steven J. Brams
Link
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt7sxc5
Publication
Related Contributor
Related Location
Related Agents
Related Authorities
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Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 343-362) and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions
http://library.link/vocab/cover_art
https://contentcafe2.btol.com/ContentCafe/Jacket.aspx?Return=1&Type=S&Value=9780691133201&userID=ebsco-test&password=ebsco-test
Dimensions
unknown
http://library.link/vocab/discovery_link
{'f': 'http://opac.lib.rpi.edu/record=b4323819'}
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 373 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780691133201
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Reproduction note
Electronic reproduction.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System details
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.

Library Locations

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