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The Resource Five basic institution structures and institutional economics, Shaorong Sun

Five basic institution structures and institutional economics, Shaorong Sun

Label
Five basic institution structures and institutional economics
Title
Five basic institution structures and institutional economics
Statement of responsibility
Shaorong Sun
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Five basic institution structures and institutional economics, Shaorong Sun
Label
Five basic institution structures and institutional economics, Shaorong Sun
Link
http://libproxy.rpi.edu/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rpi/detail.action?docID=4333618
Publication
Copyright
Related Contributor
Related Location
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Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Preface -- Two Decades of Research on Innovation -- Contents -- 1 General Principles of Institution Design -- 1.1 Institutions as a Key Tool in Behavior Management -- 1.1.1 Culture and Institutions as Two Fundamental Tools in Behavior Management -- 1.1.1.1 Culture as a S̀̀oft Limit'' on Behavior -- 1.1.1.2 Institutions as H̀̀ard Limits'' on Behavior -- 1.1.2 Culture and Institutions Must Be Taken Care of at the Same Time -- 1.2 Basic Institution Elements and the Task of Institution Design -- 1.2.1 The Two Key Elements of an Institution: Institution Rules and Institution Implementers -- 1.2.2 The Task of the Designer: Optimizing Institution Structure or Deploying Institution Components of Even Stronger Performance -- 1.3 The Hypothesis of the Rational Man and the Repeatability of Behavior Within an Institution -- 1.3.1 Rational and Irrational Man -- 1.3.2 The Repeatability of Behavior Within an Institution Makes the Hypothesis of the Rational Man the Basis for Institution Design -- 1.3.3 The Difference Between a Comprehensive Concept of the Rational Man and the Classic Concept of the Rational Man -- 1.4 The Difference Between Gaming Within an Institution and Gaming in General -- 1.4.1 Gaming Within an Institution Is Strategic While Individual G̀̀aming'' Behavior Is Simple -- 1.4.2 Commitment in À̀nnouncement'' and Commitment to R̀̀ealization'': How the Existence of the Institution Is Expressed -- 1.4.3 Individual Makes Behavioral Choice Before Institution Fulfills Commitment -- Reference -- 2 The Three Conditions for Behavior, and the Five Behavior Management Measures -- 2.1 The Three Necessary Conditions for Behavior -- 2.1.1 Behavioral Utility -- 2.1.2 Behavioral Resources -- 2.1.3 Behavioral Opportunity -- 2.2 The Five Measures of Behavior Management -- 2.2.1 Reward Measures -- 2.2.1.1 The Concept of the Reward Measures -- 2.2.1.2 Reward Types
  • 2.2.2 Resource Measures -- 2.2.3 Behavioral Cost Measures -- 2.2.4 Opportunity Measures -- 2.2.5 Observational Measures -- 2.2.6 The Relationship Diagram of the Three Conditions for Behavior and the Five Behavior Management Measures -- 2.3 Issues to Consider and Resolve When Using Reward Measures -- 2.3.1 The Numerical and Precedence Expectancy of the Reward -- 2.3.1.1 The Numerical Expectancy of the Reward -- 2.3.1.2 The Precedence Expectancy of the Reward -- 2.3.2 Issues to Note When Using Reward Measures -- 2.3.2.1 Rewards and Penalties Should Be Well Grounded and Pre-established -- 2.3.2.2 Measure Accuracy, with the Use of a High-Performance Observer -- 2.3.2.3 The Prevention of Reward Compensation -- 2.3.2.4 Improving the Detection of Positive Guiding Rewards: The More Direct the Reward Chain, the Better -- 2.3.3 Reward Interference and Promotion in the Institution -- 2.3.3.1 The Three Behavioral Tendencies of the Actor -- 2.3.3.2 Reward Interference in the Institution -- 2.3.3.3 Institution Promotion Using Rewards -- 2.3.4 Reward Measures Often Need to Be Paired with Bias-Prevention Measures -- References -- 3 Observers -- 3.1 Institution Components -- 3.2 Observer Performance -- 3.2.1 Observation Intensity (Sensitivity) -- 3.2.2 Observational Accuracy -- 3.2.3 Cost -- 3.3 Observer Types -- 3.3.1 Direct Observers -- 3.3.2 Indirect Observers -- 3.3.3 Record-Type Observers -- 3.3.4 Response-Type Observers -- 3.3.5 Verification-Type Observers -- 3.3.6 Reward-Type Observers -- 3.4 Measure Selection and Matters to Note -- 3.4.1 The Observability of the Measure -- 3.4.2 Measure Accuracy -- 3.4.3 Measure Rigidity -- 3.4.4 Being Cautious in Weighting: Avoiding Interference -- 3.4.5 Preventing Biases from the Use of One-Sided or Unfair Indicators -- 3.5 Information Bias on the Part of Information Collectors
  • 3.5.1 Observers that Make Use of Dedicated Information Collectors -- 3.5.2 Reporting-Type Observers -- 3.5.3 Observers that Make Use of Objective Information -- References -- 4 Promoters -- 4.1 Reward-Type Promoters -- 4.1.1 Fixed-Reward Promoters -- 4.1.1.1 Fixed Wages -- 4.1.1.2 Promotion by Seniority -- 4.1.2 Variable-Reward Promoters -- 4.1.2.1 Ladder Rewards -- 4.1.2.2 Rewards Based on Sorting or Ranking -- 4.1.2.3 Commission-Type Rewards -- 4.1.2.4 Options -- 4.1.3 Mixed-Type Promoters -- 4.1.3.1 Homogeneous Mixed-Rewards Promoter -- 4.1.3.2 Heterogeneous Mixed-Rewards Promoter -- 4.1.4 Reward-Type Promoter with Output Function -- 4.1.5 Combining Reward-Type Promoters and Observers -- 4.1.6 The Broad Application of Reward-Type Promoters -- 4.1.7 Comparing Rewards---Exchange Utility -- 4.1.7.1 Comparing Rewards -- 4.1.7.2 The Utility of Rewards -- 4.1.7.3 Exchange Utility as an Objective Measure for the Comparison of the True Value of Different Types of Rewards -- 4.2 Resource-Type Promoters -- 4.2.1 Resource-Type Promoters Provided Gratis -- 4.2.2 Resource-Type Promoters Provided at a Cost -- 4.2.3 Combining Resource-Type Promoters and Observers -- 4.3 Opportunity-Type Promoters -- References -- 5 Behavior Suppressors -- 5.1 Reward-Type Suppressors -- 5.1.1 Suppressors for Economic Rewards -- 5.1.2 Suppressors for Reputational Rewards -- 5.1.3 Suppressors for Rewards Pertaining to Social Standing -- 5.1.4 The Integrated Use of Various Types of Reward-Type Suppressors -- 5.2 Opportunity-Type Suppressors -- 5.2.1 Opportunity-Type Suppressors that Work Through an Admittance Mechanism -- 5.2.2 Opportunity-Type Suppressors that Work by Masking or Hiding Information -- 5.3 Resource-Type Suppressors -- 5.4 Cost-Type Suppressors -- 5.4.1 Cost-Type Suppressors that Have Formed Naturally -- 5.4.2 Designed Cost-Type Suppressors
  • 5.5 Suppressors by Drive Type -- 5.5.1 Designing an Automatic-Response Suppressor -- 5.5.2 Designing a Response-Type Suppressor -- 5.6 Suppressor Failures -- 5.6.1 Limit Failures -- 5.6.2 Compensatory Failures -- 6 The Sun Diagram and the Five Basic Institution Structures -- 6.1 The Significance of the Sun Diagram -- 6.2 Definitions of Various Terms Used in the Sun Diagram -- 6.2.1 The Actor -- 6.2.2 Behaviors and Behavior Set -- 6.2.3 Institution Components -- 6.2.4 Line Segments -- 6.3 Symbols for Institution Components and Behavior Set in the Sun Diagram -- 6.3.1 Consequences (Outcomes) -- 6.3.2 Promoters -- 6.3.2.1 Reward-Type Promoters -- 6.3.2.2 Resource-Type Promoters -- 6.3.2.3 Opportunity-Type Promoters -- 6.3.3 Suppressors -- 6.3.3.1 Reward-Type Suppressors -- 6.3.3.2 Resource-Type Suppressors -- 6.3.3.3 Opportunity-Type Suppressors -- 6.3.3.4 Behavioral Cost Suppressors -- 6.3.4 Observer or Classifier or Probability Device -- 6.3.5 Symbols for the Actor and Behavior Set -- 6.3.5.1 Discrete and Continuous Behavior -- 6.3.5.2 Determined Behavior and Probable Behavior -- 6.4 Numbering Rules for Behaviors and Components -- 6.4.1 Numbering Rules for Behaviors -- 6.4.1.1 How to Express a Discrete Behavior Set -- 6.4.1.2 How to Express a Continuous Behavior Set -- 6.4.2 Numbering Rules for Institution Components -- 6.4.2.1 Institution Components That Are the Only One of Their Kind in a Single-Actor Institution Need Not Be Numbered -- 6.4.2.2 When the Same Component Type Is Used for Multiple Behaviors, the Component Type and the Target Behavior Number Must Be Used in the Component Label -- 6.4.2.3 When Multiple Components of the Same Type Are Used for the Same Behavior, the Component Type, the Target Behavior Number and the Component Sequence Number Must Be Used in the Component Label
  • 6.4.2.4 The Actor Number in the Component Label May not Be Omitted in an Institution with Multiple Actors -- 6.4.2.5 There Is the Possibility of Ambiguity in Certain Cases, But This Is Not Common -- 6.5 Drawing Rules for the Sun Diagram -- 6.5.1 Positioning Rules -- 6.5.2 Rules Regarding Component Terminals -- 6.5.3 Rules Regarding Line Segments (Directionality) -- 6.5.4 Rules on the Omission of Behavioral Cost -- 6.6 The Five Basic Institution Structures in the Sun Diagram -- 6.6.1 The Basic Structure of the Behavior Management Institution -- 6.6.1.1 The Penalty Institution and the Bonus Institution Share a Similar Structure -- 6.6.2 The Three Basic Institution Structures for Task Sharing Institutions -- 6.6.2.1 The Double-Independent Institution -- 6.6.2.2 The Reward-Sharing Institution -- 6.6.2.3 The Cost-Pooling Institution -- 6.6.3 Benefit Distribution Institutions: The Competitive Institution -- 6.7 Some Improvements and Variations on the Five Basic Institution Structures -- 6.7.1 A Variation on the Binary or Two-Dimensional Penalty Institution: The Ternary Penalty Institution -- 6.7.2 Improving the Reward-Sharing Institution: The Use of Cost Subsidies -- 6.7.3 A Variation on the Reward-Sharing Institution: The Parallel-Cooperation Institution -- 6.7.4 Improving the Cost-Pooling Institution: The Application of Tax Collections -- 6.7.5 Improving the Competitive Institution: The Competitive Institution ẁ̀ith Cop'' -- 7 Institutions of Behavior Management -- 7.1 Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice -- 7.1.1 Basic Features of the Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice -- 7.1.2 Sun Diagram Within a Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice -- 7.1.3 Institution Parameters and Conditions for a Valid Institution
  • 7.2 Typical Parameter Example for Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice, Part I: The Presumption of Innocence
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online
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9789811003448
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computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
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