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The Resource An Economic Analysis of Conflicts : With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-49

An Economic Analysis of Conflicts : With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-49

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An Economic Analysis of Conflicts : With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-49
Title
An Economic Analysis of Conflicts
Title remainder
With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-49
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Subject
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eng
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MiAaPQ
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non fiction
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dictionaries
An Economic Analysis of Conflicts : With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-49
Label
An Economic Analysis of Conflicts : With an Application to the Greek Civil War 1946-49
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http://libproxy.rpi.edu/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rpi/detail.action?docID=4614771
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online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
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multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Economic Analysis and Civil Wars -- 1.1 The Economic Effects of Conflict -- 1.2 The Conflict of Economics: Rival Explanations of Causes -- 1.3 Empirical Relevance -- 1.4 Conflict as an Institutional Failure -- 1.5 Conflict Modelling -- 1.5.1 The Two-Numbers Problem -- 1.5.2 Enter Dynamics -- 1.6 Conflict Definitions -- 1.7 Book Structure -- References -- Chapter 2: The Greek Civil War 1946-1949: Main Events and Data -- 2.1 The Greek Conflict -- 2.1.1 Origins -- 2.1.2 Occupation -- 2.1.3 The Onset of the Civil War -- 2.1.4 Prosperity and Democracy Curtailed -- 2.2 Data Analysis -- 2.2.1 The Statistics of Conflict -- 2.2.2 Periodicity -- 2.2.3 The Conflict Distribution -- 2.3 The Escalation of Conflict -- 2.3.1 The State Army (GNA) -- 2.3.2 The Guerrilla Army (DAG) -- 2.3.3 Population Displacement -- References -- Chapter 3: Static Models of Conflict -- 3.1 Conflict Motivation -- 3.2 The Static Tullock Model -- 3.2.1 Payoffs and Win Probabilities -- 3.2.2 Optimal Effort -- 3.3 The Collier-Hoeffler Framework -- 3.3.1 Guerrillas -- 3.3.2 Government -- 3.4 Optimal Armies -- 3.5 Stylized Facts -- 3.5.1 Inequality and Class Struggle -- 3.6 Criticism to the Collier-Hoeffler Model -- 3.7 APPLICATION: Greek Grievances and Conflict -- 3.7.1 Social Grievances -- 3.7.2 Contemporaneous Deprivation -- 3.7.3 Discontent and Class Structure -- 3.7.4 Entrenched Grievances -- References -- Chapter 4: Models of Repression and Inclusion -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Repression and Inclusion -- 4.2.1 Repression -- 4.2.2 Reprisals -- 4.2.3 Fighting Capabilities -- 4.2.4 Inclusion Offers -- 4.3 Avoiding the Conflict -- 4.3.1 Peace Chances -- 4.3.2 Balance of Power -- 4.4 Break-Out of Civil War -- 4.4.1 The Guerrilla Army -- 4.4.2 The State Army
  • 4.4.3 Optimal Armies -- 4.5 Stylized Facts of Conflict -- 4.5.1 Counter-Productive Deprivation -- 4.5.2 Capabilities and Terrain -- 4.5.3 Termination and Recurrence of Hostilities -- 4.5.4 Agendas and Propaganda Wars -- 4.6 APPLICATION: Repression and Inclusion in Interwar Europe -- 4.6.1 Civil Wars in Europe -- 4.6.2 Reconciliation and Reconstruction -- 4.7 APPLICATION: Exclusion and Persecution in Greece -- 4.7.1 Measuring Repression Politics -- 4.7.2 Regional Formations -- 4.7.3 Raising the Payoffs -- Appendix -- Proof of Proposition 1 -- Proof of Proposition 2 -- Proof of Proposition 3 -- References -- Chapter 5: Dynamic Models of Conflict -- 5.1 Modelling Conflict Interactions -- 5.2 The Lanchester Model -- 5.2.1 Congestion Effects -- 5.2.2 Criticism -- 5.3 Lotka-Volterra Models -- 5.3.1 The Arms-Race Model -- 5.3.2 Non-linear Models -- 5.3.3 Steady-States and Stability -- 5.3.4 Lagged Discrete-Time Models -- 5.3.5 Fractional Models -- 5.3.6 Criticism -- 5.4 The Lotka-Volterra Model as a Cournot Competition -- 5.4.1 Payoffs in a Lotka-Volterra Framework -- 5.4.2 Reaction Functions -- 5.5 The Conflict Trap -- 5.5.1 A Non-autonomous Model -- 5.5.2 Conflict Equilibria -- 5.5.3 Stable Equilibria -- Appendix -- A. Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3 -- B. Wrong Lotka-Volterra Models -- The Civil Conflict Model: Francisco (2009, Table 2.4, p. 17) -- The Civil War Model: Francisco (2009, Table 5.2, p. 72) -- References -- Chapter 6: Estimation of Conflict Dynamics -- 6.1 Estimation Issues -- 6.1.1 Model Specification -- 6.1.2 Simultaneous Equation Bias -- 6.1.3 Stationarity -- 6.1.4 Estimation in First-Differences -- 6.2 APPLICATION: Estimating Conflict Dynamics in the Greek Civil War -- 6.2.1 Single OLS Estimation -- 6.3 Evaluating the Conflict Trap -- Appendix -- Alternative Estimations -- Endogeneity Tests -- References
  • Chapter 7: A Model of Intertemporal Conflict -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 An Intertemporal Conflict Model -- 7.2.1 Army Building -- 7.2.2 Battle Planning -- 7.2.3 The Information Set -- 7.2.4 Optimal Battle Plans -- 7.2.5 Battle-Effort Functions -- 7.3 Equilibrium and Dynamics -- 7.3.1 The Army Locus -- 7.3.2 The Battle Locus -- 7.3.3 Stability and Response to Shocks -- 7.3.4 The Dynamics of State Army -- 7.4 The Battle Equation -- 7.4.1 The Steady State -- 7.4.2 A Log-Linear Relationship -- 7.4.3 The Lanchester Analogy -- 7.5 Stylized Facts -- 7.5.1 Conflict Patterns -- 7.5.2 The Log-Linear Pattern -- 7.6 APPLICATION: The Dynamics of the Greek Civil War -- 7.6.1 Building Up the Guerrilla Army -- 7.6.2 Endurance and Defeat -- References -- Chapter 8: The Economic Impact of Civil Wars: A Production Function Approach -- 8.1 Economic Losses -- 8.2 Endogenous Growth in a Civil War -- 8.2.1 Infrastructure and Protection -- 8.2.2 Growth-Enhancing Policies -- 8.2.3 The Effect of a Civil War -- 8.3 Empirical Evidence -- 8.4 Measurable Direct Costs -- 8.5 APPLICATION: Estimating the Direct Cost of the Greek Civil War -- 8.5.1 Assumptions -- 8.5.2 Growth Accounting -- 8.5.3 Loss Evaluation -- 8.6 Bullets Versus Books -- 8.7 Counterfactual Analysis -- 8.7.1 The Cost of Conflict Escalation -- Appendix -- The Endogenous Growth Rate in an Economy with Civil War -- Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3 -- References -- Chapter 9: The Comparative Economic Cost of Civil Wars -- 9.1 The Comparative Approach -- 9.2 A Two-Stage Approach -- 9.2.1 Estimation Stage I -- 9.2.2 Estimation Stage II -- 9.2.3 Loss Evaluation -- References -- Chapter 10: A Critical Appraisal -- 10.1 The Role of Economic Analysis: A Postscript -- 10.1.1 Dynamic Conflict Modelling -- 10.1.2 The Correlates of War -- 10.1.3 Measuring the Cost of Conflict -- 10.2 Conflict as a Country Failure
  • 10.3 Greek Failures -- 10.3.1 Uncontrollable Violence -- 10.3.2 The Broken Trust -- 10.3.3 Signaling by Proxy -- 10.4 Missing Strategies -- 10.4.1 The Communist Party: A Cause Without a Strategy -- 10.4.2 The Government: Power Without a Vision -- 10.4.3 Lack of Leadership -- References -- Chapter 11: Appendix: Data Sources and Definitions -- 11.1 Nomenclature -- 11.2 Data Sources -- 11.3 Battle Data -- 11.4 Discontent Data -- 11.5 Variables
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